Electoral Act Bill 2026: Navigating Constitutional Reform and Democratic Integrity

The National Assembly is at the centre of a constitutional debate as lawmakers work to finalise amendments to the Electoral Act (Repeal and Re-enactment) Bill 2026. The debate centred on the electronic transmission of election results, which has led to street protests and intense parliamentary discord; however, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) has released the schedule for the 2027 general election and publicly affirmed its readiness to implement the framework that emerges from the legislative process, while pushing for clarity ahead of the upcoming 2026 off-cycle elections. 

CURRENT LEGISLATIVE STATUS

Following emergency plenary sessions in both chambers, the National Assembly has advanced the Electoral Act Bill 2026 through its third reading. Senate President Godswill Akpabio set up a 12-member conference committee, chaired by Senator Simon Bako Lalong, to reconcile the Senate and House versions, with the harmonisation scheduled for February 16, 2026. The urgency is tight, with upcoming electoral tests, including FCTA elections, by-elections in Rivers and Kano states, and the off-cycle governorship elections in Ekiti and Osun states, all in 2026.

The principal area requiring harmonisation is Clause 60(3), which addresses the electronic transmission of election results to the INEC’s Result Viewing Portal (IREV). While the House passed provisions supporting the clause, the Senate initially permitted electronic transmission while maintaining manual Form EC8A as the authoritative source in cases of network failure. After public demonstrations, including protests outside the National Assembly, senators clarified their position through a press conference on February 11, 2026, affirming support for electronic transmission as contained in Section 60(3).

Other significant amendments include reducing INEC’s election notice period from 360 to 180 days, officially replacing smart card readers with the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System, and enhancing penalties for electoral offences, including vote-buying.

INEC OFFICIAL POSITION

INEC Chairman Prof. Joash Amupitan addressed the electoral reform debate in recent statements, characterising the bill as having ‘sparked important discussions’ while standing firm on the commission’s independence and legal responsibilities. Significantly, INEC announced the 2027 election timetable; the presidential and National Assembly elections are scheduled for February 20, 2027, and the governorship and State House of Assembly is slated for March 6, 2027. Anambra, Bayelsa, Edo, Ekiti, Imo, Kogi, Ondo, and Osun states are excluded due to their off-cycle schedules. 

SECURITY ASSESSMENT 

1. Political Stability Indicators: Civil society mobilisation under the ‘Occupy National Assembly’ banner demonstrates citizen activism around electoral integrity and potential instability vectors, coupled with the release of the timetable, indicates a politically charged environment that could intensify if reforms are perceived as insufficient.
2. Institutional Credibility Factors: INEC’s performance during the 2023 general elections, particularly technical failures affecting the IReV portal functionality, established baseline credibility concerns that current reforms will either address or perpetuate. The commission’s release of the 2027 election schedule demonstrates administrative preparedness, though effectiveness depends on legislative clarity. 
3. Technological Vulnerability Assessment: Electronic transmission systems introduce cybersecurity requirements, including protection against denial-of-service attacks, database manipulation, and network interception. The dual-track approach (electronic with manual fallback) creates both resilience and potential exploitation vectors depending on implementation protocols and oversight mechanisms.
4. Electoral Violence Risk Factors: Historical patterns indicate that post-election violence correlates with perceived manipulation of collation processes. The degree to which final legislative provisions are viewed as adequate by major stakeholders will influence violence risk during the 2026 off-cycle elections and 2027 general elections. Flashpoints include areas where electronic transmission failures occur and manual processes are implemented, creating potential for procedural disputes.

What’s Next?

The conference committee faces technical, political, and temporal pressures in the harmonisation process. Multiple outcome scenarios exist: mandatory real-time transmission, as the House version proposes; electronic transmission with manual fallback, as the Senate suggests; or retention of INEC’s discretionary authority, as court rulings have interpreted existing law. Each pathway generates different operational, legal, and political dynamics affecting electoral integrity and public confidence. INEC’s stated readiness to implement any legislative framework suggests administrative capacity exists, though operational effectiveness depends on resource allocation, infrastructure reliability, and staff training relative to whatever transmission protocols emerge from the legislative process.

RECOMMENDATIONS

From a security intelligence perspective, the primary concern is not which specific transmission methodology prevails, but whether the final legislative product commands sufficient legitimacy across political and civil society stakeholders to minimise post-election disputes and violence risk. The process transparency and stakeholder consultation demonstrated during harmonisation may prove as significant as the substantive provisions adopted.

Organisations operating in politically exposed environments should monitor developments on the Electoral Bill, including the harmonisation expected on Monday, February 16, 2026, and presidential assent anticipated by the end of February, as the legislative outcome may influence short-term political stability. Organisations should prepare contingency protocols for potential civil unrest scenarios and enhance monitoring of protest activity, review business continuity plans for election-period disruptions, and coordinate with Beacon Security and Intelligence Limited for real-time situational awareness during electoral events. While the legislative process itself poses minimal direct operational risk, the downstream effects on the electoral credibility and stakeholder confidence warrant proactive risk management through the 2027 general election cycle.