Incident Overview

Starting from May through July 2024, the Beacon Incident Reporting System (IRS) monitored mobilisation for the #endbadgovernance2024 protest, themed 10 Days of Rage, which was scheduled to be held from August 1-10, 2024, as a response to economic challenges and perceived bad governance by the Tinubu-led administration. A splinter group with a similar stance on reform protested on July 29, 2024, in FCT Abuja.  

The main protests, which began on August 1, 2024 and ran until August 10, 2024, were characterised by peaceful processions in most parts of southern Nigeria and violence in some of the northern regions. Additionally, there were fluctuating trends over the ten days of the protests. These included variances in the turnout and spread, incidents of violence, vandalism, and looting, the tolerance levels of security operatives, and the disposition of officials to engage with the protesters, including calls by President Bola Ahmed Tinubu to engage protesters in a dialogue.

In the build-up to the protest, we monitored efforts by the federal government to dissuade the protesters. This included engagement meetings with traditional and religious leaders and with influential people. This led to calls by prominent Nigerians and administration officials, including President Bola Ahmed Tinubu, to the protesters to shelve the protests, leading some organisations that had earlier planned to be involved to pull out. 

Some of the major calls included those on July 9, 2024, when former Senate President Ahmad Lawan and separately Senators Ali Ndume and Adams Oshiomole asked the federal government to address the current food crisis and insecurity in the country to avert any potential protests. On July 23, 2024, the President, Bola Tinubu, urged the protest organisers to pause their plan and wait for a response to their pleas, following which, on July 24, 2024, the Secretary to the Government of the Federation (SGF), George Akume, held a closed-door meeting with ministers from the president’s cabinet over the protest and to plead with organisers to shelve their plans and to give a directive to the ministers to engage their constituents between July 24 and August 1, 2024. On July 25, 2024, state governors and traditional rulers at the 143rd session of the National Economic Council (NEC) meeting in Abuja, urged President Bola Tinubu to take immediate action to reduce the high cost of living affecting citizens, emphasising the need for effective governance and economic reforms. 

Security agencies and departments also issued warnings. In this regard, on July 25, 2024, the State Security Service (SSS), also known as the Department of State Services (DSS), announced what it described as a sinister plan by certain elements to infiltrate and incite violence for political purposes, aiming at regime change, and pledged to collaborate with other security agencies to maintain peace. On July 26, 2024, the FCT Commissioner of Police, Benneth Igwe, warned against the protest and announced the deployment of 4,200 officers and explosive ordnance experts. The same day, Inspector General of Police Kayode Egbetokun urged the groups planning to participate in the protest to submit details to their state commissioners of police, including protest routes, assembly points, duration, and leader contacts, to ensure a peaceful demonstration and prevent criminal elements from hijacking it, amid intelligence reports of foreign mercenary involvement. However, the Director of Defence Operations, Major General Edward Buba, stated that the military would intervene if the police were overwhelmed.

Ahead of the protests, governors and commissioners of police issued warnings against the protests, citing potential violence. 

Furthermore, some prominent figures, religious, ethnic, and other organisations, including several Senior Lawyers of Nigeria (SAN), pulled out of the protest, warning against the possible outcome and urging for dialogue and non-violence. The Trade Union Congress (TUC) also withdrew from the planned protest, citing uncertainty about the organisers, while the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) warned against attempts to prevent the protest and urged the president to engage in dialogue with the organisers. 

Despite the above-cited government efforts and pleas by different people, the organisers went ahead to protest. Some of the groups that BSIL was able to identify as the organisers include Concerned Nigerians, Nigerians Against Hunger, Initiative for Change, Take It Back Movement, Revolution Now, Human Rights Co-Advocacy Group, Nigerians Against Corruption Initiative, Citizens for Change Advocacy Initiative, Timely Intervention, Students for Change, We Coalition, Total Intervention, Refurbished Nigeria, Tomorrow Today, Our Future in Our Own Hands Initiative, Youths Against Tyranny, Call a Spade a Spade Movement, and Active Citizens Group. One of the organisations indicated plans to mobilise for a follow-up protest on October 1, 2024, Nigeria’s National Day.

Incident analysis of the 10-day protest 

Between August 1 and 10, 2024, a total of 126 security incidents tied to the nationwide protest were recorded. The incidents comprised 108 security threat events, accounting for 85.71% of the total incidents, and 18 security forces operations, which accounted for 14.29% of the total incidents across 25 states and the FCT. From a regional view, five (5) regions were impacted, particularly the North-West region, accounting for 35.56% of events, North-Central 20%, South-South 15.56%, South-West 14.81%, and North East 14.07%.

Map showing #EndBadGovernmentinNigeria Protest Events between August 1-10, 2024

Between August 1 and 10, 2024, a total of 30 fatalities tied to the nationwide protest were recorded across seven (7) states and the FCT. On a regional level, three (3) regions were impacted: the North-West region, which accounted for 56.67% of fatalities; the North-Central region (23.33%); and the North-East region (20%).

The most observed causes of death were linked to gunshots from law enforcement and unidentified armed actors; there were also incidents of unprofessional conduct by law enforcement personnel and instances of abuse of rules of engagement.

Associated with fatalities were injuries—a total of 12 injuries across six (6) states. From a regional perspective, four (4) regions were impacted: the North-West region, which accounted for 58.33% of injuries; the South-South region (16.67%); the North-Central region (16.67%); and the North-East region (8.33%).

Map showing #EndBadGovernmentinNigeria Protest Fatalities between August 1-10, 2024

August 1, 2024: We monitored protests in 24 states (Abuja, Adamawa, Bauchi, Bayelsa, Borno, Delta, Edo, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kebbi, Nasarawa, Niger, Ogun, Ondo, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Sokoto, Taraba, Yobe, and Zamfara) across five (5) regions except the South East states (Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo). There were gatherings in Enugu, but with relatively lesser participation. The protests and security deployment monitored on Day 1 were both peaceful and disruptive. In 10 protest locations (Abuja, Bauchi, Borno, Delta, Kano, Kaduna, Nasarawa, Niger, Taraba, and Zamfara), security forces used tear gas to disperse protesters. Also across 10 protest locations (Adamawa, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Kebbi, Nasarawa, Niger, and Yobe), violence was recorded involving protesters and security forces, as well as a category that has been described as ‘hoodlums’. In nine (9) protest locations (Borno, Edo, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Niger, Sokoto, and Yobe), looting and vandalism were allegedly committed by the so-called ‘hoodlums’. Accordingly, we recorded 20 deaths, mostly as a result of gunshot injuries in Niger, Borno, Kaduna, Kano, Kebbi, and Jigawa states. Furthermore, we monitored attacks on journalists and violent altercations. between pro- and anti-government groups, attacks on security forces, government property incursions, sporadic live shootings, and arrests of protesters. The Day 1 protest also saw the imposition of curfew in Borno, Kano, and Yobe states. 

August 2, 2024: Day 2 protests were monitored in 18 states, in which tear gas was used in Abuja, Akwa Ibom, Borno, Delta, and Jigawa states to disperse protesters; violence was recorded in Borno, Delta, and Jigawa states; looting and one (1) death occurred only in Borno State; and peaceful protests were monitored in Adamawa, Bayelsa, Edo, Kaduna, Kano, Lagos, Ogun, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, Yobe, and Zamfara states. Despite the curfew imposed in some states, protesters still defied these restrictions amidst the heightened security forces. There was an attack on journalists covering the protests, the use of sporadic shooting to disperse protesters, and verbal confrontation between pro- and anti-government groups. The curfew was relaxed in Borno, Jigawa, and Kano states, which allow Muslims to attend Friday prayer, while in Katsina and Yobe (Potiskum, Gashua, and Nguru LGAs), curfews were imposed.

August 3, 2024: On Day 3, protests were monitored only in 5 states (Abuja, Kano, Lagos, Plateau, Rivers, and Yobe states), with a lesser turnout of protesters due to the imposed curfew. and heightened security operatives. However, despite the curfew in Yobe and Kano states, we recorded attempted vandalism and looting in both states. We also monitored a trend of protesters hoisting Russian flags and calling for a coup d’etat by the Nigerian Army. Also, we recorded the use of tear gas and sporadic shootings to disperse protesters in Abuja and Kano State, violence in Abuja, Kano, and Yobe states, six deaths in Kano, and an attack on journalists. Furthermore, the Special Adviser to the President on Media and Publicity, Ajuri Ngelale, announced that the president will address the nation in a broadcast on August 4, 2024. We monitored the continued curfews in Jigawa, Kano, Katsina, Yobe, and Nasarawa (Keffi LGA) states.

On August 3, 2024, the Nigeria Police Force released data associated with the protests, which is at variance with that of BSIL and other organisations, including Amnesty International. Accordingly, the NPF stated on that date that seven people died as a result of the protests and that 681 suspects were arrested.

Table showing #EndBadGovernmentinNigeria Protest Arrest by the Police as of August 3, 2024

August 4, 2024: We monitored a significant decrease in the protest procession in three states, including Kano, Lagos, and Plateau states. In a national broadcast address, the president addressed the protesters, calling for an end to the violence and urging the suspension of protests. He emphasised the government’s efforts to alleviate the economic challenges through different initiatives and his administration’s commitment to deliver tangible results. Curfews were relaxed in Kano, Jigawa, and Yobe states, while Katsina and Nasarwa maintained their curfews.

August 5, 2024: Following the president’s speech, we monitored a notable increase in the turnout and spread of protest activities in 14 states (Abuja, Bauchi, Borno, Delta, Kaduna, Katsina, Kano, Lagos, Ondo, Osun, Oyo, Plateau, Rivers, and Zamfara). Tear gas was used in FCT Abuja, Azare (Bauchi State), parts of Kaduna North LGA, and Katsina states, while violence was monitored in Abuja, Bauchi, Plateau, Kaduna, and Zamfara states. One (1) death and vandalism were recorded in Bauchi State, while violent clashes were recorded in Zamfara and Plateau States. There was also continued hoisting of Russian flags, with calls for foreign intervention and coups. 

August 6, 2024: A notable decrease in the turnout and spread of protest activities, with a pocket of engagements monitored in 8 states (Abuja, Delta, Jigawa, Kaduna, Katsina, Osun, Rivers, and Yobe). However, there was violence and vandalism in Kaduna, Jigawa, and Yobe states, with a fatality in Samaru in Zaria, Kaduna State, resulting from a stray bullet from a security officer attempting to disperse protesters. Strategically, a security and defence sector leadership meeting was held at the Defence Headquarters with the Chief of Defence Staff, Christopher Musa, emphasising the pursuit of individuals inciting undemocratic governmental changes. The Inspector-General of Police (IGP), Kayode Egbetokun, stated that some of the real sponsors of the protesters hoisting foreign flags were arrested, and external funding was blocked. The Comptroller General of the Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS), Kemi Nandap, disclosed the identification and monitoring of diaspora-based sponsors, adding that they would be arrested if they attempted to enter the country. Meanwhile, the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS) expressed concern over protest-related violence and deaths, advocating for dialogue while acknowledging the right to peaceful protest.

August 7, 2024: A continued decrease in the turnout and spread of protest with activities monitored in 5 states (Abuja, Rivers, Oyo, Kaduna, and Zamfara states), incidents of violence in two (2) states (Rivers and Kaduna states), and calls for foreign intervention and coup by protesters in Zamfara States who waved Russian flags despite security warnings. Strategic security development was the ease of the 24-hour curfews imposed on Potiskum, Gashua and Nguru LGAs in Yobe State and Jos-Bukuru metropolis in Plateau State to allow residents to return to their normal activities.  The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Yusuf Tugga, reacted to the use of Russian flags during the protests in some states and stressed that Nigeria is a sovereign state and will not tolerate any interference in its domestic affairs by foreign elements bent on giving support to the protesters. He also warned that the government would not spare anyone found guilty of funding the protest, both within and outside the country. The continued arrest of protesters, including seven (7) Polish nationals in Kano State, as well as more calls by officials and civil society on the need for dialogue and peaceful resolutions. Overall, business operations gradually resumed while complying with security protocols. 

August 8, 2024: A further decrease in the turnout and spread of protest activities was monitored in 3 states (Kano, Lagos, and Rivers states). Key incidents include violence and looting of rice from a warehouse in Kano Municipal LGA, Kano State;  counter-protesters loitering and keeping vigil to disrupt any further protests in Port Harcourt LGA; an alleged raid by security operatives on the headquarters of the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC) in AMAC of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja; the subsequent condemnation of the action by the NLC, describing it as having no judicial authorisation and noting the unprecedented nature of the event; and the denial by the State Security Service (SSS) of conducting such raids in NLC. Strategic development was the calls for security forces personnel, particularly police operatives, to be held accountable by the Nigeria Police Force to investigate those responsible for the killings and disproportionate use of force that occurred during the protests, irrespective of whether they were police personnel or others, as well as protest organisers moving their convenings to social media platforms, especially on the X (formally Twitter).

August 9, 2024: A further decrease in the turnout and pockets of protest activities monitored in 3 states (Lagos, Oyo, and Taraba states). Key incidents of the day include: a mob of youths looted a truck carrying 200 bags of maize in Donga LGA; a public symposium and candlelight procession in honour of those who lost their lives due to the protest in Lagos; SSS reportedly laid siege to the office of the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights (CDHR), located at Rights House in Ikeja, Lagos; and the announcement by the Take It Back Movement (TIB) organiser for a one-million-person march to reiterate their demands, as well as the call for the sack of the Inspector General of Police, the cessation of teargas use, and the withdrawal of soldiers during protests. 

August 10, 2024: A slight increase in the turnout and spread of protest activities was monitored in 5 states (Abuja, Adamawa, Lagos, Ogun, and Ondo states). Key incidents of the day include the one-million-man march, the relaxing of curfews in Katsina and Plateau States following improved security, a robust deterrence response by security forces resulting in substantial restrictions on civilian movement, and heightened traffic congestion, impacting the flow of transportation throughout the affected areas. Nonetheless, the Action Alliance Congress (AAC) presidential candidate in the 2023 presidential election and a key organiser of the nationwide protests, Omoyele Sowore, announced during an interview with News Central TV that the demonstrations would resume on or before October 1, 2024, Independence Day, if the demands are not met.

Key themes and specific issues reported

The #EndBadGovernance protests from August 1 to August 10, 2024, highlighted several key themes and specific issues. On one hand, violent clashes between protesters and law enforcement and criminal acts such as vandalism and looting were reported across multiple states, prompting notable instances of tear gas use, which formed a large part of security responses that were largely marked by heavy-handed tactics, including curfews and military/paramilitary interventions, which led to increased tension and public unrest. On the other hand, diminishing protest participation was observed as the protests progressed, reflecting growing fatigue and reduced indulgence despite the initial calls for large-scale mobilisation.

• Violence and Clashes: The protests were marked by significant violence and armed conflict between protesters and those opposed to the protests, security forces and ‘hoodlums’ who engaged in vandalism and looting across various states, particularly in the northern parts of the country. There were incidents of vandalism and theft targeting warehouses, public facilities, government buildings, and transportation vehicles.
• Security Responses: The security force’s response to the protest was varied and largely determined by the stance of the operational heads at the location. Some security operational heads exercised commendable professionalism, while others exhibited heavy-handedness and abuse of the rules of engagement. Ahead of the protests, in some locations, including FCT Abuja and Lagos State, the authorities obtained court injunctions that restricted the protests to the Moshood Abiola Stadium, Gani Fawehinmi Park Ojota, and the Peace Park in Ketu, Lagos. 

Overall, we recorded additional security forces deployment in most locations and cordoning off of roads leading to strategic locations, which impacted movement due to the funnel effect. We recorded instances of heavy-handed techniques, tactics and practices by security personnel, such as the use of tear gas and violent dispersal methods, which contributed to the intensification of the conflict and exacerbated public dissatisfaction. There were also sporadic shootings aimed at dispersing crowds, leading to heightened tensions, escalating unrest, and the possibility of fatalities.  

Security agencies took strategic measures to address the unrest, including blocking external funding sources and monitoring foreign involvement. Additionally, there were continued arrests of protest leaders and participants, including foreign nationals, and increased scrutiny of both domestic and international actors involved in the protests.

After protesters in some northern locations called for military intervention and were seen waving Russian and other countries’ flags, the police, SSS, and military warned that they may be charged with treasonable felony, with the latter reiterating its democratic credentials and subservience to civilian rule. 

The Nigeria Police Force and other security forces in anti-protest operations raided some buildings, including those of the Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), Labour House, at Central Business District in Abuja, and that of the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, CDHR, Right House, at Ikeja, Lagos. In both instances, the action of the police was criticised by the organisations and several Nigerians, who felt that the rule of law was not followed in the operations, including the inability of the police to show their search warrants. The police on August 12, 2024, alleged that the reason for the Labour House road was because one of the shops rented out by NLC in the building was harbouring an international criminal who had a hand in facilitating the civil war in Sudan.

According to reports as of August 12, 2024, the police arrested over 1000 suspects for various offences associated with the protests and were also set to face trial. In Kano State, where over 873 suspects were arrested, the state’s police command charged them to court for various offences, while those involved in the calls for military intervention or waving flags were relocated to FCT Abuja, where they will be tried. Additionally, a few protest organisers were arrested just as the bank accounts of some of the organisations were frozen. 

Several journalists and other media practitioners alleged security forces’ harassment and heavy handedness. Some journalists reported instances where they alleged security forces were aware but failed to prevent anti-protest groups from harassing them and protesters.

Additionally, over the ten days of the protest, internet services in Nigeria were either down or slow, prompting allegations of government interference. These allegations were never substantiated, nor did the government admit to the interference.

• Diminishing Protest Participation: Over the course of the protest period, there was a noticeable decline in turnout and engagement. While the initial days saw widespread mobilisation, subsequent days experienced reduced participation, reflecting growing public fatigue and diminishing enthusiasm for the demonstrations. In some parts of south-west Nigeria, the final three days of the demonstrations were sombre, dedicated to mourning and honouring those who died.
• Foreign Intervention: Protesters in some northern locations increasingly displayed the foreign flags of Russia and even Japan in some instances and called for external intervention, signalling a demand for international support and involvement. This development raised concerns about the influence of democratic spillovers in the Sahel and associated local grievances and their complications on the domestic political landscape.

The Russian Embassy in Abuja released a statement in which it emphasised that it does not interfere in domestic affairs or those of other countries and called for caution. In Kano, Polish students were arrested. Though the arrested students are yet to be charged, the governments of Nigeria and Poland are still in dialogue, hoping to find a resolution that will allow the students to be freed.

• Federal and State Government Actions: Several state governments imposed curfews to restore public order and allow security forces to regain control of public spaces. Their actions followed meetings of the state security councils, which they chair.

In an effort to address the unrest, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu delivered a national address on August 4, 2024 urging an end to violence and emphasising the government’s commitment to economic reforms. This address engendered varied reactions and failed to curtail the protests, with criticism dominating reactions and administration officials and supporters praising his candour.

• Civil Society and Organisational Responses: The reaction from civil society was varied, with some organisations withdrawing their support or calling for dialogue and non-violence, while others threatened with violence to counter marches deemed political. Others joined the protests and voiced their support. This division highlighted differing perspectives on how to address the crisis and navigate the protest dynamics.
• Economic impact of the protests: According to the Nigerian Minister of Industry, Trade, and Investment, Dr. Doris Nkiriuka Anite, on August 10, 2024, the unrest was costing the economy more than 500 billion naira ($324.68 million) a day. It is likely that the cost of the protest to Nigeria’s informal economy is also huge and yet to be fully appreciated.
• Attempt to politicise the protests: In addition to the stance by the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) that the protests are the handiwork of its detractors, with one government official particularly singling out the leader of the opposition Labour Party, Peter Obi, as being behind the protests, other opposition parties such as the Peoples Democratic Party have issued statements criticising the government. In Kano State, where the New Nigeria Peoples Party is at the helm of affairs, it accused the APC of sponsoring the violence associated with the protests. 

In the last days of and after the protests, we are observing attempts to politicise the stark socioeconomic disparities and regional dynamics in the divergence of methodologies between some Northern and Southern states of Nigeria. The narrative being popularised is that northerners engaged in violent protests because the President is a Southerner and that this was why the protests were less violent in the South. To further buttress this narrative, the proponents falsely claim that northerners did not protest when faced with a similar cost of living crisis under the immediate past government of former President Muhammadu Buhari, a northerner. This false and dangerous narrative has the potential to further polarise an already divided nation, with dangerous consequences for national security.

• A dent on the administration’s democratic credentials: Criticisms have been meted out about the administration’s handling of the protests. Several civil society activists decried that the administration’s recognition of citizens’ constitutional right to protest was not matched by the actions of some of its officials, including security forces, who intimidated protesters and enforced measures that were deemed to prevent peaceful protesters. This was the case even for protesters who agreed to the court-granted locations in FCT Abuja, but were prevented access. 

The overall response from both protesters and the government underscored a complex interplay of socio-political tensions and the need for comprehensive conflict resolution strategies.

Strategic Developments Post-Protest: 

Freezing of Cryptocurrency Wallets

During the inaugural meeting of an expanded Council of State, on August 13, 2024, convened by President Bola Tinubu at the Aso Rock Villa, Abuja; the National Security Adviser, Nuhu Ribadu, as part of a presentation titled ‘The Nationwide Protest As It Affects National Security,’ revealed that the Federal Government had traced at least N83 billion in cryptocurrency and fiat money channelled towards the nationwide protests in Nigeria. This includes $50 million of cryptocurrency, of which $38 million was blocked in four cryptocurrency wallets, and N4 billion contributed by various political actors in Abuja, Kano, Kaduna, and Katsina, while also identifying that a European mastermind was behind the proliferation of foreign flags during the protests, who will soon be declared wanted by the police. The NSA also confirmed that eight (8) people died during the protests. The NSA’s briefing was part of presentations by other cabinet members of the administration to the Council on the state of the nation.

Trials for Protest-Linked Arrest

On August 12, 2024, reports revealed that the Nigerian Police had arrested over 1000 suspects in connection with the #EndBadGovernance protests. The announcement comes amidst growing concerns over the government’s heavy-handed response to the demonstrations. Notably, the arrests have been reported in several states, including Kano, where 76 suspects were arrested for flying Russian flags during the protests, along with 600 others for various offences, and Gombe, where 90 suspected looters got arrested, with some stolen items recovered. 

Investigation into Human Rights Abuses During the Protests

Some of the protest organisers announced on August 9, 2024, that they had submitted petitions to the National Human Rights Commission and had met with the Inspector General of Police to demand an investigation into alleged human rights abuses and disproportionate use of force by security forces during the protests. The National Human Rights Commission has issued a public acknowledgement of this petition and made a promise to conduct its investigations. Additionally, several media associations and journalists, individually and in groups, have written reports demanding for an investigation into complaints of abuses by security forces during the protests. 

State Imposed Curfews

State governments have imposed curfews in the following states:

• Jigawa (the state government relaxed curfew in 8 LGAs (Babura, Birnin Kudu, Dutse, Gumel, Hadejia, Kazaure, Kiyawa, and Roni) from 6:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. on August 4, 2024, while the State Joint Security Committee lifted curfew in the 19 LGAs as there was no violence during the protest).
• Kano (statewide) The Kano State government relaxed the curfew to 12 hours from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. on August 6, 2024.
• Katsina (Katsina State Government imposed a 24-hour curfew in Dutsinma LGA, and in the 33 LGAs, excluding Dutsinma, a 7 PM–7 AM curfew was imposed.)
• Yobe (the Yobe state government relaxed the curfew in Potiskum, Gashua, and Nguru LGAs to 12 hours from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. on August 7, 2024). The state governor relaxed the curfew from 12:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on August 4, 2024.
• Nasarawa State (Keffi LGA).
• Update: Plateau (the Plateau state government relaxed the 24-hour curfew in Jos-Bukuru metropolis; residents can move between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m.) to take effect on Tuesday, August 13, 2024. 
• Bauchi (Katagum LGA): A 24-hour curfew was imposed due to the deteriorating unrest in Azare on August 5, 2024
• Update: Kaduna (Kaduna and Zaria Metropolis and their environs): the 24-hour curfew imposed was relaxed to 6:00 p.m. – 8:00 a.m. to enable residents to carry out their legitimate activities.

Conclusion

The “#EndBadGovernmentinNigeria” protests underscore a critical juncture in Nigeria’s socio-political landscape. The socio-economic challenges, particularly the cost of living crisis, as well as the dynamic political and environmental issues that triggered the protests remain relevant and will continue to shape security and other issues in the country. Similarly, the calls for military intervention and the waving of Russian flags reflect Nigeria’s vulnerability to geopolitical influence. 

What has been adjudged as the heavy-handed approach to managing dissent by the government not only risks alienating its citizens further but fuelling a continued cycle of unrest, especially with renewed calls for further protest on or before October 1, 2024. In particular, the policing of protests by the internal security ministries, departments, and agencies requires improvement. The Nigeria Police Force and the country’s intelligence community should appreciate the dynamics of modern protests and their organic and sometimes leaderless nature, as well as the role cyberspace plays in mobilisation.  The lack of trust is particularly concerning given the need for effective law enforcement. The police’s heavy-handed tactics and questionable data on arrests and fatalities risk engendering further resentment. To rebuild public trust, the Nigerian government and police force must commit to genuine reforms, increased transparency, and a commitment to upholding the rule of law while protecting citizens’ fundamental rights.

The protests have broader implications for Nigeria’s political and security landscapes given that the triggers are still there, as are the international dimensions, the use of the cyberspace,  the gaps identified in policing the protest, particularly those of the police and intelligence agencies, and the perceived intolerance of the administration to dissent as indicated by the heavy-handedness of security forces, which further complicate the government’s pro-democratic stance and its overall legitimacy, exacerbating societal fractures.

It is assessed as credible that the majority of Nigeria’s youths appreciate the need for the policy reforms embarked upon by the Tinubu administration but require their government to put in place measures to reduce their adverse consequences. It is also assessed as credible that governments at the federal and subnational levels in Nigeria must embrace a new approach to governance—one that is people-centred and goes beyond suppressing dissent and mere protest management to honest and sincere as well as functional citizen engagement targeting particularly the youth, especially in policy making. It is further assessed as credible that all levels and branches of government must also take decisive actions to address the cost of living crisis, make food and health affordable to all citizens, reduce the cost of governance, and replace an existing reactive approach to policymaking with a more thoughtful, inclusive, and consultative process, particularly when it comes to major economic policies.